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A B S T R A C T   
Peer punishment is widely considered a key mechanism supporting cooperation in human groups. Although 
much research shows that human behavior is shaped by the prevailing social norms, little is known about how 
punishment decisions are impacted by the social context. We present a set of large-scale incentivized experiments 
in which participants (999 American participants recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk) could punish their 
partner conditional on either the level of cooperation or the level of punishment displayed by others who pre-
viously interacted in the same setting. While many participants punish independently of levels of cooperation or 
punishment, a substantial portion punishes free riding more severely when cooperation is more common (‘norm 
enforcement’), or when free riding is more severely punished by others (‘conformist punishment’). With a dy-
namic model we demonstrate that conditional punishment strategies can substantially promote cooperation. In 
particular, conformist punishment helps cooperation to gain a foothold in a population, and norm enforcement 
helps to maintain cooperation at high levels. Our results provide solid empirical evidence of conditional pun-
ishment strategies and illustrate their possible implications for the dynamics of human cooperation.   
1. Introduction 
For organizations, communities, and society as a whole to function, 
individuals often have to engage in activities that are costly for them-
selves, but beneficial for others. Peer punishment is considered to be one 
of the key mechanisms explaining the emergence and maintenance of 
cooperation in situations where private and collective incentives do not 
align (Axelrod, 1986; Boyd, Gintis, & Bowles, 2010; Boyd & Richerson, 
1992; Hauert, Traulsen, Brandt, Nowak, & Sigmund, 2007; Sigmund, 
2007; Yamagishi, 1986). Empirical evidence shows that many people 
are willing to punish those who free ride on the cooperation of others, 
even if punishment is costly and cannot lead to future benefits (Bala-
foutas, Nikiforakis, & Rockenbach, 2014; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Fehr & 
Schurtenberger, 2018; Guala, 2012; Molleman, Kölle, Starmer, & 
Gächter, 2019; Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner, 1992). The threat of pun-
ishment makes free riding less attractive and can thereby help support 
cooperation at high levels (Arechar, Gaechter, & Molleman, 2018; 
Crockett, Clark, Lieberman, Tabibnia, & Robbins, 2010; Cubitt, Drou-
velis, & Gächter, 2011; Egas & Riedl, 2008; Fehr, Fischbacher, & 
Gächter, 2002; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Gächter, Renner, & Sefton, 2008; 
Nikiforakis, 2010; Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008; Raihani, Thornton, & 
Bshary, 2012; Rand, Dreber, Ellingsen, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2009; 
Rockenbach & Milinski, 2006). 
Given that peer punishment can play a pivotal role in sustaining 
cooperation, it is critical to understand what factors influence people’s 
willingness to punish. When studying the drivers of peer punishment, 
laboratory studies typically focus on aspects specific to the interaction at 
hand, such as peers’ cooperation decisions, the cost and impact of 
punishment, or the potential for future interaction or retaliation (Cam-
era & Casari, 2009; Egas & Riedl, 2008; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Gächter, 
Kölle, & Quercia, 2017; Nikiforakis, 2010; Raihani & Bshary, 2019). In 
doing so, these studies generally abstract away from the broader social 
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context in which an interaction takes place. Cross-cultural experiments, 
however, show that social context matters for the effectiveness of pun-
ishment to support cooperation: people from different societies use peer 
punishment in systematically different ways (Gächter & Herrmann, 
2009; Henrich, 2000; Henrich, 2016; Henrich et al., 2010, 2006; Herr-
mann, Thöni, & Gächter, 2008; Oosterbeek, Sloof, & van de Kuilen, 
2004; Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, & Zamir, 1991). Because soci-
eties differ from each other in myriad ways, such cross-cultural com-
parisons have limited ability to identify exactly which aspects of the 
social context underlie any observed differences. 
In this paper, we investigate an important way in which the social 
context may influence punishment of free riding: by indicating 
‘descriptive norms’ specifying what behavior is typical in the current 
interaction setting (Berkowitz, 2005; Bicchieri, 2006; Cialdini, Kallgren, 
& Reno, 1991). Studies from across the social sciences have shown that 
people tend to conform to descriptive norms (Bond & Smith, 1996; 
Burger et al., 2010; Cialdini et al., 1991; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 
1990; Frey & Meier, 2004; Hallsworth, List, Metcalfe, & Vlaev, 2017; 
Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2008). In social di-
lemmas, it has been established that many people are more willing to 
cooperate if they believe that others will do so as well (Bicchieri, 2006; 
Elster, 1989a, 1989b; Fehr & Schurtenberger, 2018; Fischbacher, 
Gächter, & Fehr, 2001; Gächter et al., 2017; Henrich, 2016). Whether, 
and if so how, descriptive norms influence peer punishment, however, 
remains unclear. Here, we first conduct incentivized experiments and 
show that many people condition their punishment of a free-riding 
partner on descriptive norms of cooperation and punishment. With a 
simple dynamic model, we then show that such conditional punishment 
strategies can have pronounced implications for the emergence and 
maintenance of cooperation in groups. 
For the decision to punish a free riding peer, two descriptive norms 
may be important. First, punishment decisions might be guided by the 
descriptive norm of cooperation: is free riding the typical action in the 
population? It has been shown that people often infer injunctive norms 
(what one ought to do) from descriptive norms (what most people 
actually do). People tend to judge behaviors that are less common in a 
population to be less socially appropriate (or ‘moral’) and consequently 
more deserving of punishment (Chudek & Henrich, 2010; Eriksson, 
Cownden, Ehn, & Strimling, 2014; FeldmanHall, Otto, & Phelps, 2018; 
Hume, 2003; Kelley, 1971; Lindström, Jangard, Selbing, & Olsson, 2018; 
McGraw, 1985; Son, Bhandari, & FeldmanHall, 2019; Tworek & Cim-
pian, 2016; Welch et al., 2005). If people use descriptive norms of 
cooperation to form moral judgments in this manner, they will judge 
free riding more harshly when it is atypical, which will increase their 
willingness to punish. Second, punishment decisions might be guided by 
the descriptive norm of punishment: is punishment a typical reaction to 
free riding? Descriptive norms of punishment can signal a ‘principle of 
social proof’ (Cialdini & Trost, 1998) that free riding is disapproved of, 
and that punishment is an appropriate and legitimate reaction. Con-
formity to these norms would lead people to punish free riding if others 
do so as well. Examining the impact of these two descriptive norms on 
sanctioning behavior increases our understanding of how the social 
context can affect individuals’ punishment of free riding and thereby 
influence the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. 
To investigate whether descriptive norms of cooperation and pun-
ishment impact peer punishment, we conduct two decision-making ex-
periments. Participants are randomly paired and play a prisoner’s 
dilemma with punishment. Our implementation consists of two stages. 
In the first stage, participants decide to either ‘cooperate’ or ‘defect’. In 
the second stage, they decide how severely they want to punish their 
partner if their partner chose to defect. We add minimal social context 
by allowing participants to condition their punishment decisions on the 
levels of cooperation and punishment displayed by a random sample of 
participants who previously interacted in the same setting (hereafter, 
the ‘reference group’). In one experiment, participants can condition 
their punishment decisions on the level of cooperation in the reference 
group; in the other experiment, participants can condition their pun-
ishment on the level of punishment in the reference group. Importantly, 
the decisions of members of the reference group do not affect payoffs of 
the focal participants. 
Our setup enables us to classify individual participants according to 
how their punishment decisions respond to descriptive social norms, 
thereby deepening empirical understanding of individual differences in 
(conditional) punishment. Individual differences in conditional coop-
eration have received considerable attention in prior research, indi-
cating that the dynamics of cooperation in groups strongly depend on 
the interplay of individuals’ conditional strategies and their beliefs 
about others’ cooperativeness (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher & 
Gachter, 2010; Weber, Weisel, & Gächter, 2018). In contrast, little is 
known about individual differences in conditional punishment and the 
way in which these differences may affect the emergence of cooperation. 
Our experimental design allows us to isolate the possible effects of 
descriptive norms on punishment from related considerations such as a 
preference for coordinated punishment or positive reciprocity towards 
other punishers (Casari & Luini, 2009, 2012; Guala, 2012; Kamei, 2014; 
Molleman et al., 2019). Finally, by creating controlled conditions that 
systematically differ in terms of descriptive norms of cooperation and 
punishment, our setup complements cross-cultural experiments on 
punishment that rely on natural variation in social context (Gächter & 
Herrmann, 2009; Henrich, 2016; Henrich et al., 2001, 2010, 2006; 
Herrmann et al., 2008; Oosterbeek et al., 2004; Roth et al., 1991). 
Our results demonstrate that on aggregate, people’s willingness to 
punish their free riding partner increases both with the level of coop-
eration and with the level of punishment in the reference group. 
Importantly, we observe substantial heterogeneity in how people react 
to the level of cooperation and the level of punishment. When partici-
pants can condition their punishment on the fraction of cooperators in 
the reference group, many engage in ‘norm enforcement’, punishing 
their partner more with increasing cooperation levels. When partici-
pants can condition their punishment on the level of punishment in the 
reference group, many engage in ‘conformist punishment’, punishing 
their partner more with increasing punishment levels. In both cases, a 
substantial fraction of participants engages in ‘independent punish-
ment’, applying the same punishment intensity irrespective of the 
descriptive norm. 
To examine the possible long-term implications of the experimen-
tally observed conditional punishment strategies, we develop a simple 
dynamic model in which a population of agents recurrently interact in a 
social dilemma game with punishment similar to our experiments. We 
use analytical methods and agent-based simulations to evaluate how the 
experimentally observed punishment strategies can shape cooperation 
in a population. 
The model captures key qualitative features of social norm dynamics, 
involving prolonged periods of stability and sudden shifts (Young, 
2015). Moreover, the model shows that, in conjunction with indepen-
dent punishers, norm enforcement and conformist punishment can 
effectively support cooperation. Importantly, we find that norm 
enforcement and conformist punishment play markedly different roles 
in promoting cooperation: conformist punishment can effectively pro-
mote the establishment of cooperation in a population, whereas norm 
enforcement is particularly effective at maintaining cooperation at high 
levels. Overall, our model shows that the experimentally observed 
conditional punishment strategies can have a strong and positive impact 
on the dynamics of cooperation. 
2. Material and methods 
2.1. Experimental design 
We randomly matched participants in pairs to play a two-stage game 
in which they could earn points. Participants received an initial 
endowment of 25 points. In the first stage, the two players 
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simultaneously choose to cooperate or defect. Joint payoffs are highest 
when both partners cooperate, with both earning 18 points. However, 
each individual can increase their personal payoffs in this stage by 
choosing to defect: unilateral defection leads to 25 points for self and 9 
points for the other. Mutual defection leads to 16 points for each. In the 
second stage, participants have the opportunity to punish their inter-
action partner if their partner chose to defect (by design excluding 
‘antisocial punishment’; see Herrmann et al. 2008), by assigning up to 
10 deduction points to them. Each assigned deduction point reduces the 
participant’s payoffs with 1 point, and the partner’s payoffs with 3 
points. The participants’ total payoff thus constituted the endowment of 
25 points plus the points earned in Stage 1 minus the potential costs of 
conducting punishment and the potential losses from being punished in 
Stage 2. The Nash equilibrium of this one-shot game is to defect in the 
first stage, and to not assign any deduction points in the second stage. 
We report on two experiments (total N = 999) in which participants 
could condition their punishment on descriptive norms of cooperation 
(CC experiment; N = 498) or descriptive norms of punishment (CP 
experiment; N = 501). We operationalized these descriptive norms as 
behavior in a reference group of individuals who previously interacted 
in the same setting, but who were irrelevant for the payoffs in the cur-
rent interaction. Participants had to indicate how many deduction points 
they would assign to their partner (if the partner chose to defect) for a set 
of situations that vary with respect to the reference group’s levels of 
cooperation or punishment. The actual behavior in the reference group 
determined which of the situations was implemented and used to 
calculate payoffs. Section 2.3. describes our measurement of conditional 
punishment. 
2.2. Experimental procedures 
We recruited participants by posting Human Intelligence Tasks 
(‘HITs’) on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) during September 2017 
and September 2019. We restricted our sample to the United States for 
reasons of comprehension of English instructions. The only other 
participation criterion was to have at least 95% of previous HITs 
approved. The average age in our sample was 35.5 (s.d. = 10.3, range 
18–71) and 43% of participants was male. 
The experiments were programmed in LIONESS Lab (Giamattei, 
Yahosseini, Gächter, & Molleman, 2020), code is available via the public 
repository associated with this paper (https://github.com/LucasMollem 
an/LMD_Conditional_punishment); experimental instructions are docu-
mented in full in the Appendix, Section 4. Ethical approval was given by 
the Research Ethics Committee at the School of Economics, University of 
Nottingham, UK. 
After reading the instructions and passing compulsory control 
questions, participants entered Stage 1 and made their binary coopera-
tion decisions. In Stage 2, participants completed another set of 
compulsory control questions, before we asked them to provide their 
punishment responses to descriptive norms of cooperation and punish-
ment (see Section 2.3). Once participants had completed the two deci-
sion making stages of the experiment, they were placed in a waiting 
room, in which they would be matched with another participant as soon 
as they completed their decisions as well. In case no match could be 
made within 5 min, participants could choose to leave and receive a 
fixed bonus payment of $1.00, or to wait for another 2 min for a possible 
matching partner (as in Arechar et al., 2018; see Table A1 for details on 
dropouts during the experiment). Participants were informed that from 
the point of reaching the waiting room onwards, they did not have to 
make any further decisions. Excluding the time spent in the waiting 
room, our experiments on average lasted 9.9 min. The points earned by 
participants were converted to US dollars at the end of the experiment 
(20 points were worth $1.00). Average earnings were $1.96 (range 
$0.41 - $2.51), which translates to an hourly wage of approximately 
$12.00. 
2.3. Measurement of conditional punishment 
In the CC experiment, we operationalized the descriptive norm of 
cooperation as the fraction of cooperative choices in a payoff-irrelevant 
reference group (sampled from a pre-recorded pool; see below). We used 
the ‘strategy method’ (Selten, 1967) and presented participants with 
eleven situations regarding the proportion of cooperators in this refer-
ence group, spanning the full range of possible outcomes. For each of 
these situations, participants had to indicate how many deduction points 
they would assign to their current interaction partner, if their partner 
chose to defect. In the CP experiment, we operationalized the descriptive 
norm of punishment as the average intensity of punishment in the 
reference group, and participants indicated for each possible situation 
how many deduction points they would assign to their current interac-
tion partner. 
The pre-recorded pool consisted of a total of 273 MTurkers who 
played a prisoner’s dilemma with punishment mirroring our experi-
ments (cooperation rate: 69%; average punishment of free riding part-
ners: 2.7 deduction points). For each dyad in the main experiments, we 
independently sampled 50 participants from the pre-recorded pool to 
form the reference group. The behavior of the reference group defined 
the situation that was used to calculate participants’ earnings. Since 
participants did not know which situation was the actual one before-
hand, they had an incentive to consider each situation as if it was real. 
Using the strategy method has the advantage that it yields a full 
profile of punishment responses for each participant. This approach is 
commonly used to study how cooperation depends on the cooperative-
ness of interaction partners (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Herrmann & 
Thöni, 2009), and has proven useful in studying the determinants of 
punishment in cooperative interactions (Brandts & Charness, 2011; 
Cheung, 2014; Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2005; Kamei, 2014; Molleman 
et al., 2019). Although there is some concern that the strategy method 
may amplify the degree of conditionality observed (Burton-Chellew, El 
Mouden, & West, 2016; Ferraro et al., 2010; Columbus & Böhm, 2021), 
empirical research on cooperation has shown that participants who 
condition their behavior on the decisions of others under the strategy 
method also do so under the direct response method (Fischbacher, 
Gächter, & Quercia, 2012). 
3. Results 
3.1. Experimental results 
The experiments did not differ in terms of cooperation rates (CC: 
68.5%; CP: 65.5%; Х2(1) = 1.02, P = 0.313). Participants’ overall 
punishment levels, averaged across all situations, were also similar 
across experiments (CC: 2.68; CP: 2.47 deduction points; two-sample 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: df = 997, z = 1.703, P = 0.089). 
On aggregate, behavior in the reference group impacted the partic-
ipants’ punishment decisions (Fig. 1). The fraction of cooperators had a 
small but significant positive effect on the average number of deduction 
points that participants assigned to their free riding partners (Fig. 1a; P 
= 0.002; see Table A2, Model 1 for ordinary least squares regression 
results). The average intensity of punishment had a stronger impact on 
average punishment (Fig. 1b; P < 0.001; Table A2, Model 2). We 
interpret this as evidence that the social context impacts peer punish-
ment, with both descriptive norms of cooperation and descriptive norms 
of punishment modulating people’s overall willingness to punish 
defectors. 
Participants substantially differed in their punishment behavior 
(Fig. 2). In the CC experiment, 64% of participants punished at least 
once. Thirty-six percent of participants never punished, thereby avoid-
ing the costs of punishment and maximizing their own payoff. Among 
the punishers, we observe that two distinct strategies predominate 
(Fig. 2a). A large portion of punishers (33.7%) engages in ‘norm 
enforcement’, monotonically increasing punishment with the level of 
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Fig. 1. Average intensity of punishment as a function of cooperation and punishment among participants in the payoff-irrelevant reference group. Panels a and b 
summarize decisions in the CC and CP experiment, respectively, showing the average deduction points for each of the situations presented to participants (see 
screenshots of punishment stage in the experiment). Error bars indicate standard errors of the means (SEM). For statistical analysis, see Table A2. 
Fig. 2. Punishment strategies observed in our experiment. a and b, Frequency distributions of punishment strategies in the CC and CP experiment, among par-
ticipants who punish at least once (64% and 54% in the CC and CP experiment, respectively). c and d, For each strategy, the average number of deduction points 
(+/− 1 SEM) assigned to free riding partners for each of the situations in the CC and CP experiment. 
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cooperation in the reference group (Fig. 2a; green bar). An approxi-
mately equal portion (30.2%) applies ‘independent punishment’, 
responding with the same punishment intensity irrespective of the level 
of cooperation in the reference group (Fig. 2a; orange bar). A smaller 
portion of punishers (19.5%) decreased their punishment of free riders 
as cooperation became more common in the reference group (Fig. 2a; 
blue bar). 
In the CP experiment, 55% of participants punished at least once 
(and 45% never punished, maximizing their own payoffs). Again, we 
observe that among these punishers, two distinct strategies predominate 
(Fig. 2b). A large portion of punishers (45.5%) engaged in ‘conformist 
punishment’, monotonically increasing punishment with the level of 
punishment in the reference group (Fig. 2b; green bar). A substantial 
portion (32.4%) applied ‘independent punishment’, responding with the 
same punishment intensity irrespective of punishment in the reference 
group (Fig. 2a; orange bar). ‘Decreasing punishment’ was virtually ab-
sent in the CP experiment (Fig. 2b, blue bar). 
In both experiments, the distribution of strategies did not depend on 
the number of attempts participants required to complete the control 
questions (Fig. A1 and A2), suggesting that the observed patterns did not 
stem from participants misunderstanding the instructions of the decision 
situation. Taken together, these results indicate that people substantially 
vary in how they condition punishment of free riders on the levels of 
cooperation and punishment in the social environment. 
Fig. 2c and d show, for each of the punishment strategies, the average 
number of deduction points assigned to free riding partners for each of 
the situations in the CC experiment (Fig. 2c) and the CP experiment 
(Fig. 2d). Although behavior in reference group had only modest effects 
on the aggregate level of punishment, the subset of participants who 
engaged in norm enforcement (Fig. 2c; green) and conformist 
Fig. 3. Punishment behavior for the most common punishment strategies. a and b, Distributions of deduction points assigned by participants who punished 
independently and cooperated in the first stage of the game. The mode behavior for both experiments (assigning 8 deduction points; vertical dotted line) equalizes the 
earnings of a cooperator and a free rider. c and d, Deduction points assigned by participants who engaged in ‘norm enforcement’ in the CC experiment, and 
‘conformist punishment’ in the CP experiment. Dot sizes reflect the numbers of observations. 
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punishment (Fig. 2d; green) strongly reacted to the level of cooperation 
and punishment in the reference group. On average, ‘norm enforcing’ 
participants assigned 1.6 deduction points when the percentage of co-
operators in the reference group was less than 5%. Their punishment 
increased to 6.3 deduction points when more than 95% of the partici-
pants in the (payoff-irrelevant) reference group cooperated (Fig. 2c; 
green line). Similarly, in the CP experiment, participants who punished 
conformistically assigned about 0.8 deduction points when participants 
in the reference group assigned 0 deduction points on average. Their 
punishment increased to 6.5 deduction points when the average number 
of deduction points assigned by members of the reference group was 10. 
These results show that the punishment behavior of participants who use 
conditional strategies is strongly affected by the social environment. 
For participants who punished independently and cooperated in 
Stage 1, the modal behavior in both experiments was to assign 8 
deduction points (Fig. 3a,b). By contrast, assigning 8 deduction points is 
very rare among independent punishers who defected in Stage 1 (see 
Fig. A3–6 for a full breakdown of punishment decisions by cooperators 
and defectors in each experiment). This level of punishment equalizes 
the earnings between a cooperator and their free-riding partner, sug-
gesting that some participants’ do not punish to reciprocate the unkind 
action, but rather to eliminate disadvantageous inequality (Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999; Raihani & Bshary, 2019). 
Fig. 3c and d show the distributions of assigned deduction points 
among participants engaging in norm enforcement in the CC experiment 
(Fig. 3c) and conformist punishment in the CP experiment (Fig. 3d). We 
observe large numbers of data points on the diagonal in the graph for 
conformist punishment in the CP experiment. This indicates that par-
ticipants engaging in conformist punishment frequently chose to exactly 
match the average number of deduction points assigned in the reference 
group. Norm enforcement in the CC experiment showed a less pro-
nounced pattern. 
3.2. Dynamic model 
Our experimental results reveal that people’s punishment of free 
riders is shaped by descriptive norms of cooperation and punishment, 
and that various punishment strategies (conditional and unconditional) 
co-exist. This raises the question of how the observed punishment stra-
tegies interact to drive dynamics of cooperation over time. To address 
this question, we develop a simple model and evaluate it using analytical 
methods and agent-based simulations. In line with the existing theo-
retical literature on dynamics of cooperation and punishment (Boyd, 
Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson, 2003; Henrich & Boyd, 1998; Szolnoki & 
Perc, 2013), we abstract away from many details of real-world in-
teractions to focus on fundamental mechanisms and their basic impli-
cations for cooperation. In particular, we consider simplified versions of 
the conditional and unconditional punishment strategies observed in 
our experiment, and examine how their relative frequencies in a popu-
lation impact the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. 
We consider a fixed population of n agents who interact repeatedly 
for T periods in a setting similar to our experiment. In each period, 
agents (i) are randomly matched into pairs, (ii) choose whether to 
cooperate or defect, and (iii) choose whether to punish their partner if 
their partner defects. For ease of exposition and to facilitate tractability, 
we model both cooperation and punishment as binary decisions (see 
Appendix, Section 3 for discussion). In each period, each agent samples 
m agents from the population and counts how many of them cooperated 
and how many of them were willing to punish defectors in the previous 
period. The counts divided by m reflect their beliefs about the rates of 
cooperation and punishment in the current period (respectively denoted 
by bc and bp). An agent cooperates in the current period if they believe 
that the proportion of punishers exceeds a threshold (bp > θC), and de-
fects otherwise. 
An agent’s punishment strategy determines whether they punish a 
defecting partner. Based on our experimental results, we consider four 
punishment strategies: (i) independent punishment: punish irrespective of 
beliefs; (ii) norm enforcement: punish if the perceived cooperation rate 
exceeds a threshold (bc > θNE); (iii) conformist punishment: punish if the 
perceived punishment rate exceeds a threshold (bp > θCP); and (iv) never 
punish. For the sake of exposition, we will here focus on the case where 
θC = θNE = θCP = 0.5. In the Supplementary Analysis (Propositions 1 and 
2 in the Appendix), we consider arbitrary threshold values, which lead 
to qualitatively similar results. To compare the effects of punishment 
strategies on cooperation, we assume that agents’ punishment strategies 
are fixed throughout all periods of the simulation, and are mutually 
exclusive (that is, each agent is characterized by a single punishment 
strategy). 
The dynamics are stochastic: with probability ε > 0, an agent makes a 
mistake and behaves randomly; with complementary probability 1 − ε 
the agent behaves according to its strategy (Kandori, Mailath, & Rob, 
1993; Young, 1993). Mistakes are independent across agents, periods, 
and cooperation and punishment decisions. 
Our goal is to assess how relative frequencies of independent pun-
ishment (QIP), norm enforcement (QNE), and conformist punishment 
(QCP) affect the dynamics of cooperation. First, we derive analytical 
results about the stationary distribution of the dynamic when the 
observation sample is large (m = n) and the mistake probability is 
vanishingly small (ϵ → 0). The stationary distribution reflects the rela-
tive frequencies of different population states in the long run (T → ∞). 
We show that if QIP + 12 (QNE +QCP) >
1
2, only the cooperation equilib-
rium occurs with a positive frequency in the stationary distribution. 
Conversely, if QIP + 12 (QNE +QCP) <
1
2, only the defection equilibrium 
occurs with a positive probability in the stationary distribution (see 
Appendix, Section 3 for formal proof). This analysis shows that, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, independent punishment is the most potent strategy for 
promoting cooperation. Importantly, however, when independent 
punishment is not sufficiently frequent, conditional strategies of norm 
enforcement and conditional punishment can be key for sustaining 
cooperation in the long run. 
Next, we use simulations to examine the short-run dynamics of our 
model: how conditional punishment strategies drive the emergence and 
breakdown of cooperation, and how their relative frequencies affect the 
time it takes for a population to transition between states of high and 
low cooperation. Simulations also allow us to consider small observation 
samples and non-negligible mistake probabilities. To account for path- 
dependence, the simulations consider different starting conditions by 
varying agents’ initial beliefs about the rates of cooperation and pun-
ishment. To evaluate how norm enforcement and conformist punish-
ment affect cooperation, we fix the frequency of independent punishers 
at 30% and vary the frequencies of the conditional punishment strate-
gies. Further robustness checks are detailed at the end of this section. 
The full simulation code is available from the public repository associ-
ated with this paper (https://github.com/LucasMolleman/ 
LMD_Conditional_punishment). 
Fig. 4 shows the dynamics of cooperation in situations where inde-
pendent punishment is not sufficiently frequent to sustain cooperation 
by itself. We first confirm that, if independent punishers alone are too 
rare to support cooperation on their own, and neither of the conditional 
punishment strategies is present in the population, cooperation never 
emerges in our simulations (Fig. 4a,b). Next, we consider cases where 
independent punishment is complemented with conditional punishment 
strategies, raising the overall frequency of punishers. The presence of 
norm enforcement has a strong stabilizing effect once high levels of 
cooperation have been achieved (Fig. 4c). However, it might take 
considerable time for cooperation to emerge (Fig. 4d). These dynamics 
are driven by a positive feedback loop between norm enforcement and 
cooperation, locking a population into a state of either high or low 
cooperation, making it hard to transition from one state to the other. 
By contrast, in the presence of conformist punishers cooperation 
readily emerges, but is not stable (Fig. 4e,f). The population alternates 
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Fig. 4. Effects of conditional punishment strategies on cooperation dynamics. Across all panels, we hold fixed the frequency of independent punishers at 30%. QNE is 
the frequency of norm enforcement, and QCP is the frequency of conformist punishment. Columns of panels vary agents’ initial beliefs regarding the frequencies of 
punishment and cooperation in the population. In the left-hand side column, these beliefs start high (bc = bp = 0.75). This means that for all agents, the payoff 
maximizing response in the first period is to cooperate; independent punishers, norm enforcers, and conformist punishers punish their defecting partner when 
holding these beliefs. In the right-hand side column, beliefs start low (bc = bp = 0.25). This means that for all agents, the payoff maximizing response in the first 
period is to defect; only independent punishers punish defectors when holding these beliefs. In each period after the first, each agent updates their beliefs with 
probability u. We set u = 0.5 in our simulations; our analytical results apply to any 0 < u < 1 (see Remarks in the Appendix, Section 3.4). In each panel, black lines 
show mean cooperation rates over time across 100 simulation runs; grey lines show individual runs, with a representative run highlighted in green. Further 
simulation settings: n = 100, m = 10, ε = 0.05. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of 
this article.) 
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between states with low and high levels of cooperation, with rapid shifts 
between these states. These dynamics are driven by another positive 
feedback loop: when levels of cooperation and punishment are low, 
some agents may punish their free riding partner due to mistakes or—in 
the case of conformist punishers—due to sampling bias. In turn, these 
stochastic events may prompt other conformist punishers to punish too 
in the next period, thereby increasing the levels of cooperation and 
punishment even more, and possibly tipping the population to high 
levels of cooperation and punishment. However, similar stochastic 
processes may also cause cooperation to suddenly break down when 
conformist punishers stop punishing because they happen to underes-
timate the level of punishment in the population. 
When both conformist punisherst and norm enforcers are present in 
the population—but keeping the overall frequency of conditional pun-
ishers the same—cooperation rapidly emerges and remains stable at 
high levels (Fig. 4g,h). Conformist punishers still amplify the impact of 
stochasticity when cooperation is low, facilitating the emergence of 
cooperation. Subsequently, norm enforcement locks the population into 
a state of high cooperation. This result highlights that the concerted 
action of conformist punishment and norm enforcement can efficiently 
support cooperation. 
These results indicate that different conditional punishment strate-
gies can promote cooperation in different ways: conformist punishment 
facilitates the emergence of cooperation; norm enforcement helps to 
maintain it after its emergence. Fig. 5 confirms these insights. When a 
population starts from a state of low cooperation, the presence of 
conformist punishment, rather than norm enforcement, can strongly 
increase the rate at which it shifts to a state of high cooperation (Fig. 5a). 
Conversely, the presence of norm enforcement can substantially extend 
the time that a population remains in a state of high cooperation 
(Fig. 5b). 
In the Appendix we examine the generalizability and robustness of 
our model results. We confirm that our main model results hold across 
different ranges of relative frequencies of the various (conditional) 
punishment strategies and different initial beliefs about cooperation and 
punishment in the population (Fig. A8 and A9). Furthermore, we show 
that the presence of agents who decrease their punishment of free riding 
as cooperation becomes more common—as observed in the CC experi-
ment (‘decreasing punishment’ in Fig. 2a)—destabilizes the non- 
cooperative equilibrium. By itself, decreasing punishment cannot sup-
port high levels of cooperation. However, in conjunction with other 
conditional punishment strategies, norm enforcement in particular, 
decreasing punishment can boost the likelihood that a population rea-
ches high and stable levels of cooperation (Fig. A10). 
4. Discussion 
Our experiments provide behavioral evidence that punishment of 
free riding in social dilemmas is shaped both by descriptive norms of 
cooperation (“is free riding a typical action in the population?”) and by 
descriptive norms of punishment (“what is the typical punishment re-
action to free riding?”). On aggregate, punishment increases both with 
the level of cooperation and the level of punishment in a payoff- 
irrelevant reference group. At the individual level, we observe sub-
stantial heterogeneity in how people react to these descriptive norms. 
Whereas a sizable fraction of participants punishes independently of 
what others are doing (‘independent punishment’), at least as many 
participants display conditional punishment strategies, increasing their 
punishment either with higher levels of cooperation (‘norm enforce-
ment) or with higher level of punishment (‘conformist punishment’) in 
the reference group. Overall, our experimental results support the 
emerging view that conditional strategies are not limited to the domain 
of positive reciprocity, i.e., cooperation (Fischbacher et al., 2001; 
Fischbacher & Gachter, 2010; Keser & Van Winden, 2000; Weber et al., 
2018), but are also important in the domain of negative reciprocity, i.e., 
punishment (FeldmanHall et al., 2018; Kamei, 2014; Molleman et al., 
2019; Son et al., 2019). 
Our finding that people punish free riding more when cooperation is 
Fig. 5. Effects of conditional punishment strategies on the emergence and breakdown of cooperation. Lines show the cumulative probability of cooperation to rise 
above 75% (a) or fall below 25% (b), as a function of time. Time is shown on a logarithmic scale, and each line represents 500 simulation runs. Across both panels, we 
hold fixed the frequency of independent punishers at 30%. QNE is the frequency of norm enforcement, and QCP is the frequency of conformist punishment. Fre-
quencies of these conditional strategies were chosen such that—according to our analytical results—cooperation would emerge (Panel a) or break down (panel b) in 
the long run. Initial beliefs regarding cooperation and punishment levels start low in Panel a (bc = bp = 0.25), and high in Panel b (bc = bp = 0.75; see Methods for 
details). Each simulation runs for 100,000 (105) periods. Further simulation settings: n = 100, m = 10, ε = 0.05. Results for additional population compositions with 
regard to punishment strategies confirm the general pattern shown here (Fig. A7). 
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more common provides novel behavioral evidence for the idea that 
people infer injunctive norms (what is ‘moral’) from descriptive norms 
(what is ‘common’; Chudek & Henrich, 2010; Eriksson et al., 2014; 
Hume, 2003; Kelley, 1971; Lindström et al., 2018; McGraw, 1985; 
Tworek & Cimpian, 2016). In doing so, we complement existing 
research that largely relied on (non-incentivized) moral judgments 
(Eriksson et al., 2014; McGraw, 1985; Tworek & Cimpian, 2016; Welch 
et al., 2005). Our finding that people punish free riding more when 
others do so as well, adds to a growing literature showing that people 
condition their own punishment decisions on the punishment behavior 
of others. In previous studies such conformist punishment could often 
have been driven by preferences for coordinated punishment or positive 
reciprocity towards other punishers (e.g., Kamei, 2014; Molleman et al., 
2019; Kamei, 2020; for a notable exception see Son et al., 2019). Our 
experimental design rules out such considerations, providing clear evi-
dence for the impact of descriptive social norms on punishment 
behavior. 
Our behavioral approach, however, does not allow us to pin down 
the psychological mechanisms underlying the different punishment 
strategies. Recent evidence suggests that norm enforcement may be 
driven by increased disapproval of free riding when cooperation is 
common (Lindström et al., 2018). Similarly, conformist punishers’ 
observing others punishing defectors may increase their own disap-
proval of defection. Alternatively, it could be also that conformist pun-
ishers follow a simple heuristic of copying what others are doing 
(Gigerenzer, 2008, 2010; Lindström et al., 2018). The finding that 
conformist punishers frequently chose to exactly match the average 
punishment of others (Fig. 2d) suggests that the latter may be more 
likely. Future work should combine behavioral data with survey data to 
investigate to what extent (conditional) punishment reflects changes in 
people’s moral judgments after observing others’ actions, and to what 
extent it reflects people’s conformist inclinations. 
An important open issue for understanding conditional punishment 
is whether people who condition their punishment behavior on that of 
others do so consistently across different decision settings. Although it 
seems plausible that some individuals are generally more responsive 
than others to their social environment, it remains an open question 
whether individuals who engage in norm enforcement when informed of 
cooperation rates in their environment, would also tend to punish con-
formistically when informed of punishment rates. Similarly, conditional 
punishment strategies might correlate with well-studied strategies of 
conditional cooperation. Experiments addressing these associations 
would provide deeper insights into the behavioral architecture of 
cooperation and punishment, contributing to ongoing debates around 
the generality of strategies across settings involving positive and nega-
tive reciprocity (Albrecht, Kube, & Traxler, 2018; Molleman et al., 2019; 
Peysakhovich, Nowak, & Rand, 2014; Weber et al., 2018). 
Our model demonstrates how the experimentally identified condi-
tional punishment strategies can have important implications for 
cooperation dynamics. Analytical results reveal that conformist pun-
ishment strategies can considerably broaden the set of conditions under 
which cooperation can emerge and persist in the long run. Agent-based 
simulations yield deeper insights into the different roles that norm 
enforcement and conformist punishment play in this dynamic. Norm 
enforcers punish free riders when cooperation rates in the population 
are relatively high, which makes them effective in maintaining coop-
eration. However, they do not punish when free riding predominates 
and are therefore of little help for cooperation to emerge from scratch. In 
contrast, conformist punishers sanction free riders as long as sufficiently 
many others do—irrespective of the cooperation rate—and can, there-
fore, play a valuable role in helping cooperation gain a foothold in a 
population. 
Whereas our study shows that the behavior of an individual can be 
influenced by what the collective is doing, our model illustrates how 
these individual strategies can subsequently impact collective dynamics. 
Previous theoretical studies that incorporated conditional punishment 
strategies focused on long-run evolutionary dynamics and investigated 
under which conditions particular punishment strategies are likely to 
evolve (e.g., Boyd et al., 2010; Szolnoki & Perc, 2013). In contrast, we 
consider more limited time scales—over which we can take the distri-
bution of strategies in the population as given—and investigate how the 
relative frequency of particular punishment strategies impact the dy-
namics of cooperation. 
We deliberately employ a simple stylized model to illustrate the basic 
effects of conditional punishment strategies. Despite its simplifying as-
sumptions (e.g., mutually exclusive punishment strategies, binary pun-
ishment and cooperation choices, random re-matching after every 
interaction), our model produces intuitive and robust results. Moreover, 
the model is able to capture key qualitative features of the dynamics of 
social norms: prolonged periods of stability which are punctuated by 
tipping points, where one norm is rapidly replaced by another (Young, 
2015; see Fig. 4). In line with recent results (Lindström et al., 2018), we 
find that especially the positive social feedback provided by norm en-
forcers may play an important role in these patterns in norm dynamics. 
Our simulations illustrate how conformist punishment can amplify 
stochastic events, leading to both rapid alternation between the emer-
gence and breakdown of cooperation in a population (Figs. 4, 5). In 
contrast, norm enforcement can engender a process of positive feedback 
with cooperation, locking a population into a state of either high or low 
levels of cooperation, making it hard to transition to the other state 
(Fig. 4). These results give pointers for efficiently promoting desirable 
behaviors, such as voting, tax compliance, or energy conservation. In 
particular, facilitating the observability of (or accessibility to) infor-
mation about other people’s behavior may be effective when the ma-
jority of the population displays the desired behavior: this information 
can boost norm enforcement, ensuring that adherence to the present 
norm remains high. Conversely, when a majority of the population 
shows the undesired behavior, it may be more effective to provide 
people with information that informs them that many people disapprove 
of the undesirable behavior. Such information may trigger conformist 
punishment and shift the system to the more desirable outcome. 
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